Introduction
In light of the EC Commission's recent public consultation on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003, 1 First, as so often stressed -and most recently by the OECD-, "combining the function of investigation and decision in a single institution" may have the effect to "dampen internal critique" within the institution and raise "concerns about the absence of checks and balances". it appears to us an opportune moment to look again at the Commission's enforcement powers and potential need for reform in this regard. This paper considers the current accumulation of investigational, prosecutorial and adjudicative powers within the Commission in competition matters and the negative impact of that accumulation on the quality of decision-making and the problems it raises with respect to the right to a fair trial. 2 Second, from a strictly legal point of view, the combination of all powers within one institution raises the question of the compatibility of competition law proceedings led by the European Commission ("the Commission") with the fundamental right to a fair trial as enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights ("ECHR").
Creating the proper decisional structure is indeed fundamental for the quality of decisions. 3 Traditionally, the view is taken that, it is sufficient for Commission decisions in antitrust cases to be subject to review by the Community courts and particularly by the Court of First Instance ("the CFI"), even if the Commission itself is not an "independent and impartial tribunal" under Article 6 ECHR. 4 A thorough analysis of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights ("the ECtHR") shows that fundamental procedural rights are broader and apply much more strictly when However, where fines of close to a billion € are imposed today on companies and where competition law is becoming more and more criminalised, it is questionable whether this view is still valid.
any "determination" of a civil right or obligation or of any criminal charge, has to be made by an "independent and impartial tribunal" fulfilling the " 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press an public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of parties so require, or to the requirements of Article 6(1) ECHR. In addition, criminal proceedings -by contrast with civil proceedings -also have to comply with additional guarantees spelled out in the second and third paragraphs of that provision. This distinction between civil and criminal proceedings has several implications in terms of procedural rights. 11 In this respect, the ECtHR has always insisted on the specific nature of criminal proceedings as regards the rights of the defence 12 and on ensuring that Article 6 ECHR is not interpreted restrictively so that the rights guaranteed by this provision are not compromised.
In the landmark Özturk case, 18 the ECtHR applied this reasoning to the situation in which road traffic offences had been classified as mere "regulatory offences" and not as "criminal offences" in Germany and where the German judge had therefore considered that the offender was not entitled to be offered a free interpreter during the so-called "administrative procedure". The ECtHR forcefully argued that "there is in fact nothing to suggest that the criminal offences referred to in the Convention necessarily imply a certain degree of seriousness" and that it would be "contrary to the object and purpose of Article 6 (…), which guarantees to "everyone charged with a criminal offence" the right to a court and to a fair trial, if the States were allowed to remove from the scope of this Article (…) a whole category of offences merely on the ground of regarding them as petty."
19
• the classification of the offence under domestic law;
In order to determine objectively whether proceedings involve the determination of a "criminal charge" in the sense of Article 6 ECHR, the ECtHR relies in particular on:
• the nature of the offence; and • the nature and severity of the penalty (These three criteria are generally referred to as the "Engel criteria").
20
These criteria are not cumulative and do not all carry the same weight. 21 In particular, the classification under domestic law provides no more than a starting point but carries less weight than the other criteria which are more objective.
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• whether the norm is only addressed to a specific group or is of a generally binding character.
In later case-law, the ECtHR clarified and specified its second and third criteria used for the determination of a "criminal charge" as follows:
23 (This criterion is mainly used to distinguish criminal sanctions from mere disciplinary sanctions, which are generally addressed only to a specific group or a specific profession); 24 • whether the sanctions imposed are not merely compensatory but truly punitive and meant to have a deterrent effect;
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• whether the level of the sanction and the stigma attaching to the offence is important. 26 In this regard, imprisonment is considered to be the criminal penalty par excellence. However, penalties other than deprivations of liberty have in the past also be considered severe enough to justify the applicability of Article 6. In the Malige case, for example (Judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports 1998-VII), concerning a measure of docking points from driving licenses after a conviction for a traffic Thus, wherever a sanction is imposed (whatever its qualification under domestic law) whose main objective is to "deter" from future violations of the norm it is meant to enforce, where the violation of that norm is generally perceived as inherently "bad" or contrary to the common values shared in a democratic society, and where the norm is generally addressed to an undefined group of persons, this sanction will inevitably be considered as a "criminal charge" under Article 6 ECHR.
and 26

If the Contracting States were able at their discretion to classify an offence as disciplinary instead of criminal, or to prosecute the author of a "mixed" offence on the disciplinary rather than on the criminal plane, the operation of the fundamental clauses of Articles 6 and 7 (…) would be subordinated to their sovereign will. A latitude extending thus far might lead to results incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention. The Court therefore has jurisdiction, under Article 6 (…) and even without reference to Articles 17 and 18 (…), to satisfy itself that the disciplinary does not improperly encroach
Where not all these factors lead towards the same conclusion, a balancing process will have to be carried out in order to assess the possible criminal nature of the sanction imposed. It appears from the case-law of the ECtHR that the deterrent function of the sanction and its severity will have a particular weight in this regard.
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B. Proceedings under EC competition law constitute "criminal charges" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR 28
Application of the Engel criteria to EC competition proceedings (i) Domestic classification
Much uncertainty as to whether EC competition law proceedings could be considered as involving a "criminal charge" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR has stemmed from the fact that the EC law's domestic classification of sanctions imposed by the Commission for breaches of Articles 81 and 82 EC is explicitly non-criminal. Thus, the text of Article 23 (5) However, it should be stressed that such classification is of little relevance in the present context for a number of reasons:
Firstly, to the extent Article 23(5) of Regulation 1/2003 seeks to classify EC competition law proceedings for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR, it should be recalled that domestic classification is not the conclusive or the most important criterion in determining the criminal nature of proceedings under that provision. It is indeed merely a starting point, and the ECtHR has not in the past hesitated to go against this domestic classification. 29 offence, and where no possible detention as an alternative was involved, the Court found the measure to be of a severity to make it a criminal sanction (see P. VAN DIJK, F. VAN HOOF, A. VAN 
RIJN and L. ZWAAK, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on
Human Rights (4 th ed.), Intersentia, Antwerpen/Oxford, 2006, pp.548-554). In the Weber case (cited above), which concerned proceedings where the fine could amount to 500 Swiss francs and could be converted into a term of imprisonment in certain circumstances, the Court held that "what was at stake was sufficiently important to warrant classifying the offence as a criminal one under the Convention." In the Schmautzer case (Judgement of 23 October 1995, A 328-A), the Court held that driving without wearing a seat-belt, an administrative offence under Austrian law, was criminal in nature, due notably to the fact that the fine of 200 Austrian schillings had been accompanied by an order for committal to prison in case of non-payment. 27 See notably Bendenoun v. France, cited above, at para. 47; and Jussila v. Finland, cited above. 28 This section deals with the application of the Engel criteria to EC competition law. In other words, it deals with the criminal nature of EC competition law as appreciated in light of the ECHR. It is noted that this is obviously a different question from whether the Commission is a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR. As consistently found by the ECJ, and as the Commission's itself agrees, it is not. See e.g. This is understandable, since the opposite conclusion would result in signatory states being able to unilaterally determine the scope of protection enjoyed by individuals under Article 6 ECHR.
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It is possible also that at the time of adoption of Regulation 17/62, Member States genuinely believed that the sanctions proposed -and perhaps even the proceedings more generallywere not truly of a criminal law nature. After all, for many years the fines imposed for even the most egregious breaches of Article 81 EC were sanctioned with fines running at most to tens of thousands of EUR, as opposed to thousands of times those amounts today, and the rhetoric surrounding enforcement was very different.
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When the provision was then taken over word for word in Regulation 1/2003 -and again no discussion at all appears in the initial proposal for Regulation 1/2003 34 in which the text already appeared-it is possible that there was a continued concern about a perceived transfer of competences in the criminal sphere. However, as noted above, this does not of course address the issue of substance in relation to Article 6 ECHR.
One crucial point to note, however, is that -unlike the situation under Regulation 17/62 -in retaining the provision in Regulation 1/2003, it is certain "The issue of the compatibility of the Community's competition procedure as a whole with Article 6 of the ECHR will be particularly important if, as seems probable, the fines which can be imposed by the Commission come to be regarded as criminal penalties for the purposes of Article 6." that at least some consideration was also given to Article 6 ECHR. This point was simply too important to be ignored given in particular the developments in the ECtHR case law over the previous decades, which clearly indicated that the fines in similar contexts were criminal in nature (see below (ii)). However, what the intention of Article 23(5) was in relation to this point remains a mystery.
To our knowledge, the only institution to leave an official public trace of its consideration of the criminal nature of sanctions under Regulation 1/2003 is the European Parliament (which, it is recalled had only a consultative role in the legislative process). In its position document, the European Parliament did not request the removal of Article 23 (5) Secondly, although fines imposed by the Commission are explicitly classified as non-criminal, this does not necessarily imply that proceedings relating to EC competition law infringements are inherently non-criminal in nature. This is an important point, since Article 6 ECHR requires the respect of certain fundamental rights in the determination of "criminal charges" and "criminal offences" and does not talk in terms of criminal sanctions (which constitute only one of the Engel criteria). In determining this, the nature of the sanctions that are imposed is only one element (one of the Engel criteria). 36 Another important consideration is the stigma attaching to the offences. Thus, whilst maintaining that sanctions imposed by it are not criminal, the Commission has pursued an active policy of heavily stigmatizing violations of EC competition law, and indeed the current Competition Commissioner has explicitly equated cartel activity to theft. 36 It is, however, noted that whilst certain sanctions may be compatible with the classification of a charge as non-criminal, others -in particular imprisonment -will automatically imply that a charge is criminal (See i.a. Engel and Others, supra note 17 at para 82; Campbell and Fell, Judgment of 28 June 1984, Series A 80, at para 72.) In other words, in classifying a charge as criminal for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR, the imposition of a certain type of sanction may be sufficient but is not necessary. 37 See below at point under Section I.B. (iii).
Member States that can impose custodial sentences, individual fines and other sanctions on natural persons for breaches of EC competition law. 38 As a result, as Article 6 ECHR is intended to protect against violations by public authorities of the fundamental right of access to justice, it is clearly appropriate to consider classification in the legal system in which the law is actually enforced by authorities, i.e. classification both under EC law and under national law. And it is arguably difficult to accept that a different classification would apply depending on which authority (EU or national) applies the rules. Otherwise Member States might indeed easily circumvent their obligations under the ECHR by delegating them to a centralised authority.
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In conclusion, we therefore do not agree that Article 23 (5) But also in absolute terms, the level of fines for breach of EC competition law are generally economically very significant, 46 and indeed the imposition of fines for violation of EC competition law may (and in many cases does) result in the company that is fined going into liquidation. 47 In this regard, it should be observed that in line with the punitive and deterrent character of the fines that are imposed, there is no strict relationship between these and the profits derived from or impact of the illegal activity (although the impact of distortions of competition is to some extent taken into account).
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And the Community does not refrain from applying typical criminal law concepts such as the notion recidivism, which is treated as an aggravating factor aimed at deterring repeat offending by materially increasing the level of fines imposed. This is an important feature of the Commission's approach to fining as the very presence of the concept in this area and the resulting escalation of penalties point to an intent not only to deter but also to morally condemn the impugned behaviour, to stigmatise it and, ultimately, to treat it as criminal. 49 methodology for the setting of fines, the particularities of a given case or the need to achieve deterrence in a particular case may justify departing of a particular case from such methodology or from the limits specified in point 21." (emphasis added). See also Commissioner Neelie Kroes' declarations in the Financial Times of 29 November 2007 about the fines imposed by the Commission in the new flat glass cartel: "the important thing is that the fine as a whole is sufficiently deterrent, so that none of these companies will be tempted to infringe the rules again." 44 It appears for example that fines imposed in the US for tax evasion, which is the most serious federal tax crime, can only reach a maximum amount of 250.000$, whereas the most serious corporate crime possible would be subject to sanctions raising until 290.000$. These sanctions are thus far less important than those which may be imposed for serious antitrust violations, and this tendency seems to be even more obvious in Europe, where the maximum penalties that can be imposed for antitrust violations are higher than in the US and Japan. Sources: http://law.jrank.org/pages/1065/EconomicCrime- Tax 47 For instance, in the District Heating Cartel case the fines led to liquidation for numbers 2 and 3 on the market, the companies Løgstør Rør and Tarco. 48 Thus -according to the fining guidelines-, in determining the basic account of the fine to be imposed, the Commission will take the value of the undertaking's sales to which the infringement relates into account. The Commission will also take into account the need to increase the fine in order to exceed the amounts of gains improperly made. 49 51 The ECtHR has in the past explicitly stated that fining policies designed to deter re-offending are indicative of "criminal charges" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR.
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Other aspects such as the introduction of leniency policies at EC and Member State level appears relevant in this regard. 53 Finally, in relation to the stigma Thus, a number of Member States have formally criminalised certain types of competition law violations attaching to violations of competition law, for the purposes of analysis this question can be looked at from the point of view of presentation (i.e. how such offences are presented to the public by relevant authorities), perception (i.e. the public reaction to such offences) and consequences (i.e. the consequences for businesses and individuals of violations of competition law with which they are associated).
These three elements of presentation, perception and consequence are dynamic and interrelated. However, as a general observation, there has been a very marked tendency over the past decade in particular for violations of competition law to be presented increasingly as an extremely serious form of attack on society, carrying grave consequences, and one to which members of the public should not only be concerned about but also react to. 54 and in certain cases provide for imprisonment, 55 or in any event apply significantly higher fines than in the past. 56 Other types of sanctions also exist, for example in the UK, where individuals involved in violations of EC or national competition law may be temporarily prevented from acting as company director, 57 Beyond these formal sanctions, there may also be other consequences for i.e. a restriction on such individuals' freedom to undertake a certain profession. in the press. Nonetheless, there is evidence that implication in such violations often result in individuals losing their positions within their company.
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Neelie Kroes, EC Commissioner for Competition As regards the rhetoric used against persons that violate EC competition law, it is not the purpose of this article to exhaustively analyse the speeches of public officials charged with implementation. However, as a general observation, violations of EC competition law are presented by enforcers as very serious, as an attack on society and as "comparable with theft". A number of quotes are set out below to illustrate this point: The above observations demonstrate a clear EC policy to stigmatise violations of EC competition law through the way in which the offences are presented to the public and the consequences of their breach.
Actual public reaction to and perception of anticompetitive conduct constitutes another dimension of the stigma attaching to an offence. This is clearly a more difficult aspect to measure. In conclusion on the above, it follows from consideration of the nature of EC competition law, the nature and severity of the sanctions resulting from and stigma attaching to its violation, that EC competition law proceedings should be treated as "criminal charges" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR, as interpreted using the Engel criteria laid down by the ECtHR.
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In the Stenuit case, concerning proceedings led by the French competition authorities, the Human Rights Commission classified these proceedings as criminal for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR, explicitly rejecting the French government's arguments to the contrary. The
Human Rights Commission noted that "the aim pursued by the impugned provisions of the Order of 30 June 1945 was to maintain free competition within the French market. The Order thus affected the general interests of society normally protected by criminal law (…). The penalties imposed by the Minister were measures directed against firms or corporate bodies which had committed acts constituting "infractions". The Commission further points out that the Minister could refer the case to the prosecuting authorities, with a view to their instituting criminal proceedings against the 'contrevenant'."
As we shall see in the following section, this analysis is furthermore confirmed by the ECtHR and the Human Rights Commission's own case-law, as well as the case-law of a number of national supreme courts in the Member States. With regard to the nature and the severity of the penalty to which those responsible for infringements made themselves liable, the Human Rights Commission went on to observe that:
Case law of the ECtHR and European Human Rights
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The Human Rights Commission therefore concluded in this case that the Minister's decision to impose a fine constituted, for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR, determination of a "criminal charge" and that the fine in question had to be regarded as a criminal penalty. The case was finally not adjudicated by the ECtHR, as the applicant and the French government settled the case. Indeed, the infringements that had been found had largely been remedied after the creation of the French Competition Council (Conseil de la Concurrence).
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In another case, Neste St. Petersburg v. Russia, 68 In a more recent case Jussila v. Finland, the ECtHR considered that the antitrust proceedings led by the Russian authorities were not "criminal" in nature, but this was due to the fact that Russian competition law only "empowers the antimonopoly bodies to impose administrative sanctions (…) for obstructing the authorities investigations and do not serve as punishment for substantive antimonopoly violations." Furthermore, the ECtHR noted that "section 6-1 of the Competition Law, under which the applicant companies were charged, does not provide for any specific sanctions as such" and that the confiscation order to which the applicant companies were subjected "is intended as pecuniary compensation for damage rather than as a punishment to deter re-offending." (emphasis added) 69 the ECtHR reviewed its previous case-law and confirmed that:
"the autonomous interpretation adopted by the Convention institutions of the notion of a "criminal charge" by applying the Engel criteria have underpinned a gradual broadening of the criminal head to cases not strictly belonging to the traditional categories of the criminal law, for example administrative penalties (Öztürk v. Germany), prison disciplinary proceedings (…) competition law
Thus, in the RioTintoZinc Case for instance, the House of Lords found that EU competition fines were "penalties" and that therefore the principle of non-self-incrimination applied under the Civil Evidence Act.
(Société Stenuit v. France, …) and penalties imposed by a court with jurisdiction in financial matters (…)."
It is thus clear from this review of ECtHR case-law, as well as of decisions of the Human Rights Commission, that competition proceedings, in the course of which the Commission takes a decision imposing fines on undertakings, are to be qualified as "criminal" under Article 6 ECHR.
Case law of national courts supporting the criminal charges classification
The position of the ECtHR referred to above has meanwhile been endorsed by a number of the highest courts in the Member States. 70 The French Constitutional Court has also stressed the gravity of antitrust fines and therefore that all the principles attaching to the rights of defence apply and the French Cour de Cassation went so far as to rule that the participation of the rapporteur in the deliberation of the Conseil de la concurrence, to the extent he has undertaken investigations during the fact-finding process, was contrary to Article 6(1) ECHR.
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In a number of early cases, the ECJ was clearly reluctant to accept the applicability of Article 6 ECHR to such proceedings.
Case law of the ECJ on the criminal charges classification
Whilst there is thus wide support for the proposition that competition proceedings in which fines are imposed are to be qualified as "criminal" under Article 6 ECHR, the case-law of the ECJ to date remains unclear in this regard. confirmed that antitrust fines were not of a criminal nature as deciding otherwise, this would "infringe seriously on the effectiveness of Communitiy competition law". It is underlined that the effectiveness of the law is not among the Engel criteria affecting criminal classification. Moreover, it is unclear what "effectiveness" should be read to mean in this context. If it is to be understood as meaning that criminalisation may (significantly) reduce the number of (successful) prosecutions, that is of course possible. However, the same might be said of many other undoubtedly criminal areas of the law. Were theft to be treated as non-criminal, for example, and the relevant procedural safeguards dispensed with, there would almost certainly be a sharp increase in the number of prosecutions (particularly if the police were granted the power to prosecute and judge the cases themselves). This would, however, be to the detriment of the quality and soundness of decisions, and in the medium to long term the credibility of the justice system. It is also noted that there are of course plenty of examples of legal systems that formally criminalise competition law and offer the corresponding safeguards, but without finding that the system collapses or grinds to a halt.
5.
Arguments against the criminal charges classification
Having considered in detail above the reasons why EC competition law proceedings must be regarded as involving criminal charges within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR, it seems to us that none of the counter-arguments that are or could be invoked against this position are decisive. Article 23 (5) 80 The main other arguments against a classification of competition law proceedings as involving criminal charges are discussed below:
However, a general appeal to traditional conceptions of what is criminal does not appear particularly rigorous and fails to take into account evolution of society. Fifty years ago the notion of environmental crime basically did not exist. One hundred years ago selling opium was in many countries not regarded as criminal. Two hundred years ago, slavery was in many countries not regarded as criminal. But three hundred years ago anticompetitive conduct was already regarded as criminal in England and similar examples can be cited bank to the Roman Empire, where at times certain market distorting behaviour carried the death penalty, Competition law is not part of the "core" criminal law One objection to the conclusion that EC competition law proceedings involve a criminal charge under Article 6 ECHR is that they are not "traditionally" looked on as criminal, or do not constitute "core" criminal offences.
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Reflecting the dynamic nature of criminal law, the ECHR generally interpreted in a dynamic manner, which arguably means the "traditional" epithet is in fact justified. 82 True, EC competition law violations are obviously not on a par with horrific crimes such as murder or rape. However, as has been seen above, they are frequently equated with the more traditional and familiar crime of theft. and the concept of criminal Article 6 ECHR specifically must take into account evolving perceptions (as discussed above, for example, the Engel criteria refer among others to "stigma", not fifty years ago but today).
Moreover, ECtHR case law explicitly recognises that Article 6 ECHR is not intended to be limited to crimes that have been around for a "long time". As the ECtHR observed in the Jussila case quoted above: "the autonomous interpretation adopted by the It follows that appeals to tradition in the classification of offences under the criminal head of Article 6 ECHR is misplaced.
A more balanced variation of this argument is that, although competition law violations may fall under the criminal head of Article 6 ECHR, they are not "core" offences or serious enough to warrant the full gamut of protections offered under that provision. 82 See the judgment of the ECtHR in Jussila v. Finland, cited above fn. 69. 83 See above at Section I.B.1(ii).
As a preliminary remark, Article 6 ECHR itself distinguishes only between civil and criminal heads, and lays down clear criteria for determining which of these applies. As discussed above, in the case of EC competition law, it is undoubtedly the criminal head that applies. Within the criminal head of Article 6 ECHR
(ii)
, the ECtHR's case law does in fact distinguish between minor and disciplinary offences and other offences falling under the criminal head. This distinction is considered in detail below. However, it is worth noting here that, although there is clearly a sliding scale of seriousness of offences, the relative positioning of offences on that scale is -except in extreme cases -highly subjective. It is therefore logical and appropriate that the ECtHR does not seek to make legal distinctions between, for example's sake, a fully fledged "force 10" criminal offence and a mere "force 8.5" criminal offence, with a fixed list of procedural rights attaching to the former and a shorter list of procedural rights attaching to the latter. Such distinctions would, in our view, be arbitrary in the extreme.
No prison sentences are imposed by the Commission and moreover sanctions are imposed on companies not individuals 84 However, there are again a number of flaws with this argument, and mainly the fact that fulfilment of the Engel criteria does not require the possible imposition of prison sentences. Under the Engel criteria the nature and severity of sanctions is considered. Whilst the imposition of prison sentences would be sufficient to classify related offences as criminal within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR, it is certainly not a necessary condition and offences can be considered as criminal where 'only' fines are imposed.
Another argument made to support the theory that EC law is not "real" criminal law, is that sanctions are imposed on companies only and that no prison sentences are involved. 85 Finally, as is well known, the ECHR does not distinguish between natural and legal persons as regards the rights they enjoy under Article 6 ECHR.
In any event, as discussed above, prison sentences can in fact result from violations of EC competition law, where these are imposed by Member States' courts.
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Nothing in this argument therefore puts in doubt the criminal classification of EC competition law proceedings under Article 6 ECHR.
Again, it could be argued that, whilst EC competition law clearly falls under the criminal head of Article 6 ECHR, within that criminal head
there are offences of varying degrees of seriousness that merit different levels of procedural rights. However, beyond the basic distinction operated between minor and non-minor offences that is considered in greater detail below, such an argument is, in our opinion, no more valid in this context than in the context of an argument based on "traditional/core" and "non-traditional/non-core" offences (see above). The argument that procedural safeguards in antitrust cases are inferior to those offered in criminal proceedings and therefore support the view that such proceedings are not criminal is logically flawed. It would be circular to refer to the very procedures, whose legality is under examination, to assist in determining the standards that they should respect.
Thus, under the ECHR, the classification of an offence as criminal must result in certain procedural safeguards. The reverse, however, is not always true. In other words, the absence of those safeguards might well indicate that an offence is not criminal, but it could equally indicate that the state is simply not offering the safeguards that it should be.
One variation on this argument is that in a "true" criminal context, suspects get a tougher time than they do in EC competition proceedings. Thus, for example, individuals may be crossexamined in court by hostile prosecutors, investigative powers of relevant authorities are more significant, there is trial by jury, the prospect of jail sentences etc. 88 Moreover, it must be emphasised that being subjected to a Commission competition investigation is hardly a pleasant experience. Vast quantities of documents are demanded by the Commission, initial failure to cooperate with investigations (by, for example, invoking the right to silence or legal privilege) regularly results in threats of criminal sanctions at which point individuals will often submit. This practice was indeed recently condemned by the Court of First Instance in the Akzo case These arguments suffer from similar logical failures to those discussed in the preceding paragraph. Thus, the way procedures are designed results from the process of classification and not vice versa. 
html).
The text is extensively quoted here because it is a good example of an attempt to validate a logically flawed argument through repetition (argumentum via repititio):
"Just so we are under no illusion, let us remember how a real criminal enforcement system operates. In the United States the Justice Department always prosecutes suspected price fixers criminally. The primary investigative instrument is the Grand Jury. Targeted individuals are summoned for examination on oath by hostile prosecutors without benefit of judge or counsel. Vast quantities of documents are subpoenaed. Corporations cannot hide behind the Fifth Amendment, and individuals who invoke the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination may find themselves obliged to testify nevertheless under strictly limited court-ordered immunity. Failure to cooperate will mean prosecution for contempt of court, obstruction of justice or perjury. Remember too that the Justice Department now often calls on the FBI to assist: house searches, consensual telephone monitoring, sending turned conspirators "wired up" into cartel meetings -these are commonly employed to gather evidence. And of course a Sherman Act indictment can well be reinforced by prosecutors adding a racketeering or wire fraud count. Grand Juries, it should be said, almost always find a "true bill", i.e. they vote to indict.
The criminal trial itself is usually before a Federal jury -that is, if the accused plead not guilty. Almost invariably where the evidence is convincing they will seek a plea bargain on the best terms they can get. The Justice Department on conviction will always press for a prison term as well as fines: under recent amendments it is a felony and the jail sentence can be up to three years.
A jury verdict is final as to the facts. One can go to the Circuit Court of Appeals, but while most appeals are on evidentiary questions, they are concerned with narrow questions of admissibility or the adequacy of the judge's directions to the jury. As long as there was some evidence on which to convict, the Appeal Court does not go into the facts." the documents would amount to obstruction of the investigation and could constitute a criminal offence under section 65 of the UK Competition Act, which is punishable by a term of imprisonment and a fine. It was only under strong protest that the applicants handed the Set B documents to the Commission for examination. Furthermore, during the investigation the Commission inspectors read and described to each other the contents of the Set A and Set B documents for several minutes at a time.
[…]
It is also apparent from the report and the minutes mentioned above that the Commission insisted on taking a cursory look at those documents and that the applicants' representatives only agreed to this after the Commission and the OFT officials informed them that refusal to allow them to do so would be tantamount to obstructing the investigation, an action which would be punishable by administrative and criminal penalties.
In those circumstances, the Court considers that the Commission forced the applicants to accept the cursory look at the disputed documents, even though, as regards the two copies of the typewritten memorandum in Set A and the handwritten notes in Set B, the applicants' representatives claimed, and provided supporting justification, that such an examination would require the contents of those documents to be disclosed."
For individuals involved in the investigation, there may also be the possibility that they will be criminally pursued by Member State authorities.
(iv)
As indicated above, in Volkswagen,
Application of Article 6 ECHR "would impringe seriously on the effectiveness of Community competition law" 90
It is worrying however to see as a quite general and recent development fundamental rights to be purely set aside, temporarily suspended or simply diminished for the declared purpose of attaining objectives such as the "good administration of justice" or the "effectiveness of the law". Such attempts have already been fiercely criticized by supreme courts in Europe and in the US in the context of the so-called "war on terror". the ECJ found that if decisions imposing a competition fine were to be regarded as of a criminal law nature, "this would impinge seriously on the effectiveness of community competition law". This argument, which has already been commented on above, is hardly more convincing than the previous one. The more serious the offence, the more necessary it is to comply with procedural safeguards. Arguments of administrative efficiency or convenience are hardly sufficient to warrant infringements of fundamental rights. These arguments cannot affect the finding of the ECtHR inter alia in Jussila that competition law procedures have to respect the basic requirements of Article 6 ECHR. There is no reason therefore to see why this would constitute a more valid argument in the field of EU competition law.
Conclusion
On the basis of the above, we conclude that EC competition law proceedings leading to fines can only be considered as "criminal" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR. In the next section we will now look at the main consequence of this finding for the conduct of these proceedings.
II. Criminal charges must generally be heard at first instance by an independent and impartial tribunal, EC competition law is no exception
A. Introduction
The right to a fair trial as embodied in Article 6 ECHR requires in the first place that any judgement concerning the determination of civil rights or of any criminal charge be given by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. This right is often regarded as "one of the most important guarantees of the whole Convention".
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As indicated above, this right is stricter in criminal -than in civil -cases. One consequence of this is that, whilst the ECtHR generally admits that the right to a fair trial is fully complied with in civil cases when effective access to a court is only exercised on appeal (meaning that the first determination of the right can be made by an administrative body and that the case is being heard on appeal by an impartial and independent tribunal having full jurisdiction), it will in principle not admit such two-tier jurisdictional review with regard to "criminal cases". This is due notably to the particular nature of criminal offences, on which the ECtHR has always been reluctant to compromise.
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As it is put in the case law of the ECtHR, "
[a]n oral, and public, hearing constitutes a fundamental principle enshrined in Article 6 § 1. This principle is particularly important in the criminal context, where generally there must be at first instance a tribunal which fully meets the requirements of Article 6 (…) and where the applicant has an entitlement to have its case "heard", with the opportunity inter alia to give evidence in his own defence, hear the evidence against him and examine and cross-examine the witnesses." 94
The ECtHR has only ever admitted exceptions to this principle of first instance decision by a tribunal in narrow circumstances, essentially where the criminal charges under consideration are either minor or disciplinary in nature.
Notwithstanding, discussions on this point often involve a cursory and general extension of the exception to all areas of criminal law except the "traditional" areas of criminal law, in other words, the exception becomes the rule.
A more careful reading of the case law does not, however, allow such conclusions to be drawn. The general principle, as set out in the above quote, is that criminal charges must be heard at first instance by an independent and impartial tribunal and any derogation from this is exceptional and must be justified
B. The right to a first instance independent and impartial tribunal in criminal cases and the scope of exceptions
. In light of their nature and the penalties involved, EC competition law proceedings cannot be considered as falling within such exceptions. The inevitable conclusion is that having such cases heard by the Commission at first instance is incompatible with Article 6 ECHR. These points are considered below.
In the following part of this paper (part C), we will then consider the alternative view, i.e. that the exception can extend to EC competition law, and the consequences this has for the type of judicial review that is then required. And finally we will address a few other issues that may be problematic in the EC system viz Article 6 ECHR (part D).
1.
Introductory However, EC competition proceedings do not simply escape from Article 6 ECHR because a body that falls outside the notion of "tribunal" has been put in charge of them. In other words, the applicability of Article 6 ECHR:
"[a]lthough the Commission combines the investigative and prosecutorial with adjudicative functions, and thus cannot be qualified as an independent and impartial tribunal, this does not as such make the current system incompatible with Article 6 (1) ECHR. Indeed,
How then can Article 6 ECHR be respected? In response to this, it is generally argued that:
the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that, for reasons of efficiency, the determination of civil rights and obligations or the prosecution and punishment of offences which are "criminal" within the wider meaning of Article 6 ECHR can be entrusted to administrative authorities, provided that the persons concerned are able to challenge any decision thus made before a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and that provides the full guarantees of Article 6(1) ECHR." 97
However, this does not reflect the case law of the ECtHR. Rather, the ECtHR states that "in the criminal context, […] In other words, according to the above, the fact that the Commission does not constitute an independent and impartial tribunal does not result in a violation of Article 6 ECHR, because its decisions are reviewed by the CFI and such a two-tiered procedural approach has been endorsed by the ECtHR.
generally there must be at first instance a tribunal which fully meets the requirements of Article 6" 98 In its famous judgment in Le Compte v. Belgium, the ECtHR held that "whilst Article 6 par.
(…) embodies the "right to a court" (…), it nevertheless does not oblige the Contracting States to submit
and refusal of such access at first instance is therefore the exception. The key question is accordingly whether EC competition law is capable of falling within this exception, such that subsequent judicial review of Commission decisions imposing sanctions for breaches of Articles 81 and 82 EC by the CFI is sufficient to comply with the requirements of Article 6 (1) ECHR. We therefore consider in detail below the case law of the ECtHR on this point and whether EC competition law can be considered as falling within this exception.
2.
Requirement of an independent and impartial tribunal at first instance and its exceptions: case law of the ECtHR 
of the General Tax Code (…), Contracting States must be free to empower the Revenue to prosecute and punish them, even if the surcharges imposed as a penalty are large ones. Such a system is not incompatible with Article 6 (…) of the Convention so long as the taxpayer can bring any decision affecting him before a court that affords the safeguards of that provision." 102
It does however not follow from the Bendenoun judgment that the exception allowed for criminal cases in Öztürk applies not only to "minor offences" but to all criminal cases in general as soon as there would be a "large number of offences" to punish.
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In this regard it should be recalled that the ECtHR has always insisted on the peculiar nature of criminal proceedings with regard to the application of Article 6 ECHR, 104 as well as on the restrictive interpretation to be given to the exceptions developed by case-law. 
to a first instance tribunal which fully met the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (…)." 111
Thus, it appears that a first instance tribunal is necessary in criminal cases in order to comply with Article 6 ECHR. This is a legal obligation from which it may only be derogated in exceptional circumstances in criminal proceedings, i.e. when "minor offences" (such as traffic offences or tax surcharges) are at stake 106 See footnote . This exception may be explained by the fact that in particular because in such minor cases, either the judge's review of the case will not be compromised or coloured by the pre-existence of an administration decision or the risk of such compromise is worth taking in light of certain factors (less serious nature of the offence, the great volume of cases, etc.)
In the case of minor offences indeed the procedural defects of the administrative stage are outweighed by the benefits gained from the efficiency of the whole system (e.g. the economy of procedural costs, the expediency of the procedure, the possibility for the administrative authority to concentrate its scarce resources on more serious cases, etc.) combined with the possibility to have these procedural defects redressed on appeal in any case. However, in normal criminal cases, the rights of the defence outweigh these marginal advantages.
As will be shown below, the requirements of independence and impartiality are indeed not purely formalistic but lay at the heart of the principle of due process. For reasons of judicial efficiency or economy, only exceptionally may the requirement that the sanction is imposed by a tribunal be derogated from and only provided that there is a possibility for judicial review against the decision taken. The distinction drawn by the ECtHR between "minor offences" and other violations forming part of the "core of criminal law" can be traced back to the Öztürk judgment in 1984.
3.
Competition law infringements leading to sanctions cannot be regarded anymore as "minor offences" However, as shown above, the ECtHR has only applied this line of case-law so far to minor traffic offences and tax surcharges or still to disciplinary offences where criminal sanctions were small. In fact, as the ECtHR explained in Jussila, this distinction is linked to the progressive stretching out of the notion of "criminal sanction" under the ECHR following the application of the Engel and others criteria: it would simply have been very difficult to require Member States to comply with all the requirements of Article 6 in areas such as traffic offences and tax surcharges, where hundreds of thousands of minor violations take place every year.
The same cannot be said about Community antitrust proceedings, not only because they are less numerous, but also because a number of factors indeed indicate that competition law proceedings can no longer qualify under the "minor offences" exception allowed under ECtHR case-law. 114 This increase seems even to have accelerated in the last two or three years. . It has to be observed that in this case the majority did not disagree with this finding of the minority but merely held that in casu, there was no lack of impartiality at the appeal stage. The mere fact that the accused had first been judged in his absence by the same judges that subsequently judged him on appeal did not reveal any lack of impartiality The Human Rights Commission recalled however (at para. 65) that impartiality was required already at first instance. A problem might occur for instance"where a trial judge had previously held in the public prosecutor's department an office whose nature was such that he may have had to deal with the case (…), or exercised the functions of an investigating judge with extensive powers and particularly detailed knowledge of the files (…), or taken pre-trial decisions on the basis of legal provisions requiring a particularly confirmed suspicion (…)." 113 Cited above. 114 Commission Decision of 21 st February 2007, case COMP/E-1/38.823, no public version yet available. 115 The latest fine imposed by the Commission has raised the total amount of fines imposed by the Commission in antitrust cases to more than 3 billion EUR in 2007. The total fines of 486 million EUR which were imposed in the recent Flat Glass case were imposed for cartel activities lasting less than a year. This makes some lawyers suggest that, on the basis of the Commission's new Fining Guidelines, allowing for amounts of fines reaching the 30% turnover, fines beyond 1 billion EUR could become the new benchmark (in Financial Times of 29 November 2007, "Flat Glass groups are fined 500 million EUR"). Thirdly, as indicated, the stigma attached to violations of competition rules has increased dramatically, cartels being prohibited in stronger terms than ever.
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The current institutional system before the Commission is not only problematic because it goes against the requirements of the ECtHR. It is also problematic because the accumulation of investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative powers by the Commission during the whole proceedings in antitrust cases leads naturally to what is called "prosecutorial bias", i.e. the fact that a case handler will naturally tend to have a bias in favour of finding a violation once proceedings have been commenced. The case-handler's position is in this regard not different from the position of a defence lawyer who naturally develops a bias in favour of his client. Applied to the Commission in competition proceedings, this however means that the Commission will be naturally more inclined to find the existence of a breach of Articles 81 and 82 EC and to take a decision imposing sanctions than if this decision was taken by an
The progressive evolution of the Commission's fining policy with regard to competition law infringements, considered together with the clarification of Article 6 ECHR by the ECtHR, make it obvious today that the current Community system in antitrust proceedings is not in line anymore with the fundamental right to a fair trial. Indeed, while the Commission is "determining" at first instance "the existence of a criminal charge" (in the sense of Article 6 ECHR), it is not complying with the substantive requirements imposed by this provision.
It can therefore only be concluded that competition law infringements leading to sanctions cannot be regarded anymore as "minor offences", and that there is therefore a requirement of an independent and impartial tribunal already at first instance.
4.
The conjunction of investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative powers by the Commission and the problem of prosecutorial bias independent and impartial tribunal which played no role whatsoever during the investigation of the case. In good "Hegelian dialectics", a sound system would however require "thesis", "antithesis" and "synthesis" by three different actors. A "Salomon" with an open mind should listen to both parties and then decide the case.
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The existence of a "prosecutorial bias" is generally explained by the following set of factors:
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• First, there is a natural tendency for persons investigating on a case to search for evidence which confirms rather than challenges one's beliefs, and to accept more readily the conclusion to a syllogism if it corresponds to one's belief than if it does not, irrespective of its actual logical validity (a so-called "confirmation bias"). Such a confirmation bias certainly exists in proceedings relating to the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, because the Commission will normally only start an investigation if the officials of DG Competition hold the initial belief that an infringement is to be found.
• Secondly, there is what psychologists call hindsight bias or the desire to justify past efforts. As one author has put it "it is understandable in human terms that Commission officials sometimes want to push through what they perceive to be 'their' case. And it explains why arguments put forward by the parties often appear to fall on deaf ears." 120 This may be simply explained by the fact that person will naturally refrain from coming to conclusions that put into question the validity of their past conclusions. An official of DG Competition for example will be reluctant, after having pushed a case through and issued a statement of objections, to consider later in its investigations that the case for the finding of an infringement was weaker than he had initially thought. This may be explained not only by internal psychological factors but also by the need to justify past decision to hierarchical superiors or to outside observers.
• Thirdly, there is the desire to show a high level of enforcement activity. This aim has also been actively pursued by the Commission in competition matters, as exemplified by the statistics published on its website 121 and by numerous speeches of Competition Commissioners insisting on the number of decisions imposing fines and on the high level of these fines. 122 While this may be a legitimate means to ensure deterrence, there is obviously also "a potential risk of abuse, in that dubious cases might be pursued or fines might be inflated in order to keep up the statistics." A prosecutorial bias does however not arise in a system in which the competition enforcement authorities prosecute before an independent court, as it is the case in a large number of countries in the world. 124 Such a system does not only provide for better procedural safeguards against partiality and prosecutorial bias, but enjoys higher legitimacy for those undertakings on which sanctions are imposed, with the result that there is a higher degree of acceptance of the decision and that fewer appeals are being brought before superior courts.
The current "prosecutorial bias" is only partly remedied by the recent introduction of "peer review panels" composed of experienced officials in order to scrutinise the case team's conclusions with a "fresh pair of eyes". Indeed, if the peer review normally takes place before the sending of a statement of objections, in all cases applying Article 82 EC, it only applies to cases applying Article 81 EC "where appropriate" and in principle not in cartel cases. 126 Second, this system is by no means equivalent to having an independent administrative law judge taking a decision following a full trial in which both sides of the case are present. Third and in any event, the Commissioners are not "walled-off" from discussion of the matter with the staff investigating the case while the case is under adjudication.
127 Fourth, it is also questionable whether such a duplication of tasks simply results in more lengthy and costly proceedings, 128 with the decision-taking phase of the administrative proceedings becoming "a superfluous anticipation of the work which will be done anyway by the reviewing judge".
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Finally, the most insidious and intractable problem with this accumulation of powers by the administrative authority is that its impact on the outcome of a decision is impossible to measure. As the ECtHR stated in Tsfayo, " [o] 
ne of the essential problems which flows from the connection between a tribunal determining facts and a party to the dispute is that the extent to which a judgment of fact may be infected cannot easily be, if at all, discerned. The influence of the connection may not be apparent from the terms of the decision which sets out the primary facts and the inferences drawn from those facts. (...) Thus it is no answer to a charge of bias to look at the terms of a decision and to say that no actual bias is demonstrated or that the reasoning is clear, cogent and supported by the evidence."
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The fact that prosecutorial bias has a definite but immeasurable impact on the outcome of decisions is probably a further reason why decisions in criminal cases should in our view always be taken at first instance by a tribunal respecting all the requirements of Article 6 124 Such as Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia and Norway for example. In the 27 EU Member States, practice is much more contrasted, with 14 countries (namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) still allowing for sanctions to be taken by the investigating authorities, subject to subsequent judicial review by an independent court, while in the 13 others (namely Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Malta, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) these sanctions -which are often considered as having a criminal character -may only be imposed by an independent body or court (within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR), with the investigating authority playing the role of a prosecutor before it. This classification may be subject to some changes, depending on the definition of a court in every single case and to internal reforms. 125 In this regard, see F. MONTAG, cited above, at p. ECHR. Unlike cases under the civil head of Article 6 (and exceptionally minor criminal offences), the risk that prosecutorial bias will not be corrected by subsequent judicial review is simply unacceptable in criminal cases. This is why the ECtHR excludes as a matter of principle that, except in exceptional cases, criminal sanctions are imposed at first instance by an administrative body.
5.
The right to a hearing that is public
Oral hearings present companies accused of violating competition law with a last chance to defend themselves before the Commission rules on their case. Such hearings -which are also attended by officials from the EU Member-States-are always held behind close doors largely to shield the companies involved and guard against the release of sensitive business secrets. Even when parties waived their right to a confidential hearing to ensure a full and fair examination of the issues and urged the Commission to hold a public hearing this has been denied. and then probably only for minor and/or mere disciplinary offences.
As will be explained in more detail below, proceedings before the Commission in competition cases are led by a team of Commission officials investigating the case. Parties have the right to express their views orally during these proceedings before a Hearing Officer, who will subsequently report to the Competition Commissioner on the content of this hearing. Finally, the Commissioner in charge of competition brings the case before the full College of Commissioners, who -although it did not attend the hearing-takes a final decision.
It should be recalled at this stage that the right to be heard means that no decision may be taken against a person unless that person was previously given an opportunity to state his or her position on the issue.
A proper hearing is not only necessary to ensure greater acceptance of the decision, but allows opposing positions to be directly confronted and challenged, including the possibility for cross-examination and interactive exchanges. Obviously, this requires the presence at oral proceedings of the persons who are ultimately deciding the case. 138 In most EU Member States, hearings in competition law proceedings take place before the persons (whether it is an independent judge or an administrative authority) responsible for taking the final decision (see but also that the general requirements of fairness embodied in that provision are not being given enough attention.
C.
If 143 Such a system would thus only be acceptable with regard to antitrust cases if it were to be admitted that antitrust violations constitute "minor offences" such as traffic offences or tax surcharges in the light of Article 6 ECHR. 144 The main question is therefore what is meant by "full judicial review". Does it suffice to have a mere control of legality, as currently exercised by the CFI and the ECJ in antitrust matters, or is it necessary to have a complete de novo review, implying the possibility for the judge to remake entirely the whole decision?
In our view, and as indicated, criminal sanctions such as those imposed by the Commission for antitrust violations are not "minor offences" and can only be imposed at first instance by an independent and impartial tribunal. However, even if it were to be considered that antitrust violations benefit from the "minor offences" exception -quod certe non-the question is then whether the current standard of review exercised by the Community courts in antitrust cases does amount to a "full judicial review" as required under Article 6 ECHR. 145 In this regard, it is clear that a different standard of review applies with regard to civil cases than in criminal cases. 146 With respect to decisions concerning the "determination of civil rights and obligations", the ECtHR has stated that in specialised areas of an administrative nature, it is sufficient for the court of review to exercise a restricted jurisdiction and to leave the determination of primary facts to the administrative body, "particularly where the facts have already been established in the course of a quasi-judicial procedure governed by many of the safeguards required by Article 6 para. 1 (…)". 147 In these cases "it is generally inherent in the notion of judicial review that, if a ground of challenge is upheld, the reviewing court has power to quash the impugned decision, and that either the decision will then be taken by the review court, or the case will be remitted for a fresh decision by the same or a different body". 148 However, when the determination of the facts lies at the heart of the judicial proceedings and of the applicants' contestation, the ECtHR requires that the review Court must have the power to rehear the evidence or to substitute its own views to that of the administrative authority. Otherwise, there would be a risk that "there was never the possibility that the central issue would be determined by a tribunal that was independent of one of the parties to the dispute".
In cases concerning the "determination of a criminal charge" however, the ECtHR takes a stricter approach, requiring that the appeal jurisdiction does not only verify the correct application of the law by the administrative authority but is also able to engage in a complete reassessment of the facts and of the evidence produced before it ("de novo review"). It follows from the above that the requirements of the ECHR are extremely strict and require effectively a full de novo review of the case.
The standard of review applied by the ECJ and CFI
This strict approach has to be contrasted to that of the Community courts which take a fairly conservative approach as to their own competence. The same reasoning can be found in most judgments, such as most recently in the Microsoft case or in the Deutsche Telekom case. 156 In this regard, it should also secondly be recalled that Articles 229 and 230 of the EC treaty only confer unlimited jurisdiction on the Community courts with regard to the determination of pecuniary sanctions. 157 As one of its former members has stated, the CFI is, "essentially, a review court. That is to say its function is not to rehear the case or to substitute its own opinion for that of the Commission, but to review the legality of what the Commission has decided." 158 In the light of ECtHR case-law, it is clear that judicial review by the CFI in antitrust cases should not be limited to questions of law and to the determination of the appropriate level of the fine, but should also extend to a full reassessment of the facts and to the expediency of the Commission's decision. The CFI cannot limit its analysis to "manifest errors of appraisals or misuses of power" but should in every case reassess fully the facts and the choice of the appropriate legal and economic tests applied to these facts. The "unlimited jurisdiction" that the Community Courts are entitled to exercise should not be limited to altering the amount of the fines imposed on companies but should also extend to the very determination of the infringement giving rise to these sanctions. Indeed, the progressive change of nature of antitrust proceedings and of the sanctions are imposed in such proceedings now require "full judicial review", as it is understood by the ECtHR, in these cases.
Conclusion
D. Other issues that are problematic in the EC system viz Article 6 ECHR
In this regard, two other features of the current system of judicial review appear problematic in the light of ECtHR case-law.
The first issue is the absence of suspensory effect for proceedings brought before the Community Courts. 160 As shown for instance in the quotation from the Kyprianou judgment hereabove, a proper system of full jurisdictional review by an independent tribunal requires automatic suspensory effect. However, under the EU competition system, even if there is the theoretical possibility for companies to request a suspension of the application of the Commission's decision, such a request will almost invariably be rejected in practice, due to the extremely strict conditions that have been developed by the Community courts in their case-law. 161 As a result, companies have no choice but to comply with a Commission decision imposing very important fines before having had the opportunity to a "fair trial" complying with the requirements of Article 6 ECHR. This is illustrated by the Microsoft case where Microsoft was forced to divulge under the threat of daily penalty fines valuable knowhow before any court had ever heard its case. 162 This practice has also been condemned by the ECtHR in criminal cases. 163 A second issue is the obligation which is put on national courts not to contradict a Commission decision when they are dealing with a case based on the same facts than those being dealt with by the Commission. 164 
III.
Conclusions -The way forward
Thus, companies could not only be subject to the fines of the Commission, but also possibly to injunctive relief or damage actions in several Member Sates with authoritative reference to the Commission's decision, before having been offered the chance of being heard in accordance with the requirements of a fair trial embodied in Article 6 ECHR. Under the current case-law, national courts have no obligation to refer questions of validity of Community decisions to the ECJ if they find that there is no reason to consider such acts illegal, nor are they under any obligation to stay proceedings until a judgment is given by the Community courts.
There is a growing tendency towards building a more efficient economic justice and a high level of enforcement of antitrust rules by public authorities. This cannot be done however at the cost of disregard for fundamental rights. The intention of some Member States to formally "decriminalise" competition law is unacceptable at a time where the level of the fines and other remedies which are imposed on companies have never been as high.
The case-law of the ECHR makes very clear that -except for "minor offences" sanctions must be imposed at first instance by an independent and impartial tribunal fulfilling all the requirements of Article 6 ECHR. Subsequent judicial review is not sufficient in that regard.
The day has therefore come to start thinking about a profound reform of the current system, both to comply with the ECHR and to make it more efficient and legitimate. Ideally, this should be done by granting the decisional power to the CFI, or to a new competition court.
In this regard, the view has sometimes been expressed that such a reform would require a modification in the treaties themselves, under which it is allegedly the Commission which is responsible for developing competition policy and ensuring compliance with the competition rules, not the ECJ, whose role is only to ensure that "in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed". 165 In It can be recalled here that in areas other than competition, the Court has been entrusted with the power to find infringements (see e.g. ECA p. 226) and there is no reason why the same should not be true in antitrust cases.
